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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ENGINEER

CE 319.1 (18 Apr 46) I

APD 500  
18 April 1946

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies

TO: Chief of Engineers, War Department, Washington 25, D.C.  
ATTENTION: Chief Military Intelligence Division.

1. Reference is made to your letter, above subject, dated 26 February 1946. The attached review of Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS), by Colonel H. G. Schenck, represents the view of the agency charged with the preparation of engineer intelligence reports in connection with the New Guinea and Philippines operations and the anticipated operations against the mainland of Japan. This review leads to the conclusion that JANIS was timely and valuable; and offers the following recommendations for improvement:

- a. Elimination of conflicting and contradictory features.
- b. Expansion of Chapter I to a fully integrated overall summary of the remainder of the study.
- c. Inclusion of references and estimates of reliability.
- d. Utilization of specialists only in the preparation of all elements of the studies.

2. The following comments represent the views of the undersigned, derived from experience, both in the preparation of certain chapters of JANIS, the actual use of these studies and other intelligence reports in the planning of engineer operations in the field, and in the extension of these studies by theater resources. In this connection it would appear pertinent to submit a general appraisal of terrain intelligence as required for military operations.

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3. Theoretically, at least, intelligence data should be available to the planning agencies concerned with military operations, in the following order:

a. Broad studies at National Defense level to serve as basis for overall strategy.

b. Technical and terrain studies at National Defense level relating to the features affecting operations in the given area.

c. Theater level studies of a general nature based on a above, expanded and modified by theater experience and information to serve as a guide in the application of resources.

d. Detailed feature analyses at theater level in extension of b above, based upon the latest information available.

e. Further extensions of c and d by the tactical commands charged with the actual conduct of operations.

4. As far as is known to the undersigned, no broad studies of the character indicated in paragraph 3a above were prepared for use of the major strategic staffs during the course of the war. No doubt individual studies of this character were prepared, however, by the Joint Intelligence and Joint Logistic Committees of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It may be argued that such broad intelligence studies upon which the major strategic conceptions are based in part, cannot be prepared with assurance without the benefit of detailed research, the result of which would appear eventually in comprehensive reports such as JANIS. Major strategy, however, is seldom governed by local conditions. For example, had the Joint Chiefs of Staff been aware of, or concerned with, climatological conditions and construction and transportation difficulties involved in the Leyte Operation, the operation might not have been authorized. It may be assumed that the elements of broad strategy will continue to be governed by generalized appraisals which may be made without intensive research.

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5. The exact place of JANIS in the scheme of intelligence studies is difficult to establish. While I do not have a copy of the JANIS charter, it is my assumption from the nature of the contents, that the following represent its objectives:

a. To inform the strategic planners as to physical and economic features of a given area in sufficient detail to permit a fair appraisal of the military task involved in as far as the task is affected by these features.

b. To provide supply and technical services sufficient data by which major decisions as to technique, transportation, construction and allied matters may be made.

c. To provide to the major tactical command concerned, background data as far as available at National Defense level, as a springboard from which it may take off in pursuit of greater detail.

6. As actually prepared, JANIS appears to have attempted to take a middle ground between the broad general study required by the strategic planner and the detailed feature analysis required by the technical services and the tactical commands. The features having a pronounced effect upon supply, equipment, training and techniques must be analysed in maximum detail, and at an appropriate time, by experts thoroughly familiar with their subject and with the requirements of their prospective customers. Most of the information required is strictly factual and must be so reported. The accuracy of the work depends upon the quality of the source material available to the analyst and his capacity to select, appraise and reconcile inconsistent and contradictory data. JANIS was an attempt to present these data in consolidated and sometimes abbreviated form. That attempt resulted from the inescapable conclusion that independent studies by various Army and Navy intelligence agencies were introducing many duplications, rivalries in the acquisition of source materials and

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inconsistent conclusions. Further, such independent studies prepared without overall guidance not only made it impossible to assemble a complete picture at any one time, but also required all using agencies to assemble and consult a tremendous mass of references. JANIS was late entering the intelligence field, its direction by the Joint Intelligence Committee of J.C.S. was inadequate and its formation was makeshift arrangement to coordinate independent agencies already well organized and embarked on independent programs. The staff assembled for JANIS was not competent to appraise the contributions of the agencies to which were assigned various elements of the studies, nor to reconcile inconsistencies in reports; hence it became primarily an editing and publishing agency. The excellent format of the publications gave them an air of competence and stability, inspiring a confidence not always justified.

7. In order that the objectives of JANIS as set forth above may be attained, it is necessary first, that the staff responsible for their preparation receive positive direction by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or comparable authority at National Defense level as to areas to be covered, priorities and time schedules. The actual collection, analysis and publication for such studies may proceed by either of two methods:

a. Through the operation of similar intelligence agency at National Defense level made up of experts of all essential categories. Such an organization has strength in mass production, in the elimination of competition for source material and in the elimination of duplication and inconsistencies. It has a disadvantage in its inability to meet rapid changes in plans or to provide spot information of vital interest to one or a few planning agencies. Further, the selection of personnel for such a dominant intelligence agency will be greatly hampered by the reluctance of interested agencies to

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release competent experts. The centralization of detailed intelligence studies runs the further risk of misdirection into selected channels based on the backgrounds and pre-dominant interests of the key personnel.

b. A supervisory and coordinating staff at National Defense level with individual elements of the studies assigned to the agencies of primary interest. This procedure was adopted by JANIS. If properly organized and furnished adequate direction and support, such an organization has the advantage of insuring intelligence experts and of permitting greater flexibility in their employment. The disadvantage of duplication and contradiction are apparent but can be largely eliminated by close supervision and cooperation. The major danger in such an organization is diversion of effort at the changing whims of the individual research agencies, i.e. concentration on immediate problems to the neglect of long range objectives.

8. Of the two methods indicated, I would choose the latter, i.e., research and preparation by the agencies of primary interest; direction, supervision, publication and distribution by a centralized agency at National Defense level. For such an organization to be effective, there must be:

a. Positive direction.

b. Rigid assignment of subjects and enforcement of directives.

c. Firm time schedules for original preparation and revision.

d. Consistent and competent supervision from the National Defense level.

Such an organization must be equipped with a full time staff.

9. Summary. These remarks are not extended to include intelligence studies at theater and lower levels, a subject which

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is closely related to studies such as JANIS. The major factor in the concentration and conservation of effort on essentials of intelligence is the element of time. Theoretically a planning directive passed from higher to lower levels should be accompanied by a summary of intelligence data plus references to completed studies. In general, this procedure did not prove practicable during the war, since as a rule, planning directives were issued while the pertinent intelligence data was still in course of preparation. This leads to the conclusion that intelligence data necessary to support a planning directive cannot be prepared from scratch during the course of military operations.

#### 10. Conclusions.

a. The preparation of joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies on the order of JANIS should be a normal peace time function at the National Defense level.

b. Contents of such studies should accord in general with JANIS with the exceptions that:

(1) All subjects should be treated as exhaustively as the character and availability of source materials will permit.

(2) Strictly military features (strength, compositions, equipment, tactics and technique) of foreign military forces are not proper elements of this type of study.

(3) Sources of information should be fully documented and appraised.

(4) A brief or summary (Chapter I) treating on subjects of the study with equal emphasis should be prepared for the use of strategic planners at the National Defense level.

c. The organization charged with the preparation of such studies should be under the direct supervision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and should operate on a 100% basis.

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d. The various features should be assigned to those elements of the National Defense organization having primary interest, under strict directives as to priorities, time schedules, scope, coordination and revision.

e. Manuscripts should be maintained in loose leaf form ready for assembling and publication at any time.

For the Chief Engineer:

/s/  
HERBERT B. LOPER  
Brigadier General, CE  
Chief Engr. Intel. Div.

1 Incl:  
Incl 1 - Review of JANIS by  
Col. H. G. Schenck

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